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Comment
Deadlock and Dissolution in the
Close Corporation: Has the Sacred
Cow Been Butchered?
Once it be granted that the participants in a close corporation should be
permitted, as between themselves, to impose personal vetoes on the pow-
ers usually vested by our corporate statutes in majorities, it seems clear to
the writer that a simple and flexible remedy for deadlock or stalemate
must be provided, and that the untouchability of the sacred cow must not
be permitted to impede its exercise. Too precise definition, too onerous
requirements as to who may seek relief, and too much rigidity of available
remedy will do social harm. What we need is faith in the sensitivity of the
Chancellor's foot, and to permit him, with due dignity, and in a proper
case to apply the boot to the sacred cow of corporate existence.
1
L INTRODUCTION
The general rule at common law was that in the absence of spe-
cific statutory authority, a court of equity had no power to dissolve
a solvent corporation in a suit brought by a minority stockholder.2
The major reason provided for the rule was that the corporation
was a creature of the state. Thus, it was reasoned that only an
agent of the state should have the power to dissolve the corpora-
tion.3 That reason, however, was given at a time when corpora-
l. Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and
Dissolution, 19 U. Cm I REV. 778, 793 (1952). In this classic presentation
written 26 years ago, Mr. Israels called for a reform of corporations law to
better meet the needs of the closely held corporation. Traditionally, statutes
have provided for perpetual corporate existence; consequently, courts gener-
ally have refused to destroy the legislatively created corporation. "[T]his sa-
cred cow has all too often been an effective road block in cases where the
overall best interests of the owners of the enterprise call for its dissolution or
liquidation." Id. at 778.
2. See Grocery Supply, Inc. v. McKinley Park Serv., 128 F. Supp. 694 (D. Alas.
1955); Lyon v. Bolliger, 221 Ark. 423, 253 S.W.2d 773 (1952); Hepner v. Miller,
130 Colo. 243, 274 P.2d 818 (1954); Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, Inc., 39
Del. Ch. 244, 163 A.2d 288 (1960); Steenrod v. L.M. Gross Co., 334 II1. 362, 166
N.E. 82 (1929); Benedict v. Columbus Constr. Co., 49 N.J. Eq. 23, 23 A. 485
(1892); Strong v. McCogg, 55 Wis. 624, 13 N.W. 895 (1882). See also J. TINGLE,
THE STocKHoLDER's REMEDY OF CoRPoRATE DIssoLUTION 25-32 (1959).
3. See Comment, Dissolution at Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 41 MicH. L. REv.
714 (1943). For a study of judicial approach to this reason, compare Thwing v.
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tions were created by special charters conferring exclusive
privileges. 4 With the subsequent movement to legislatively cre-
ated corporations, the reason underlying the common law rule no
longer carried any force. 5
In addition, courts have refused to aid aggrieved shareholders
because of a general reluctance to interfere in business affairs of
corporations. 6 By invoking either the business judgment rule7 or
Minowa Co., 134 Minn. 148, 152, 158 N.W. 820, 822 (1916) ("When it has become
impossible to accomplish the purpose for which the corporation was
chartered or organized, or when failure or ruin is inevitable, the courts may
intervene and wind up its business .... ") with Manufacturers' Land & Im-
provement Co. v. Cleary, 121 Ky. 403,406,89 S.W. 248,249 (1905) ('The corpora-
tion owns its property... No court is ever permitted to interfere with an
owner's control of his property so long as it is lawful, no matter how foolish it
may be.").
4. Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind Up a
Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Shareholder, 40 CoLum. L. REV. 220, 223
(1940). In Goodwin v. Von Cotzhausen, 171 Wis. 351, 358-59, 177 N.W. 618, 621
(1920), the court stated:
[The common law] rule had its origin at a time when corporations
were created by special charters the grants of which conferred valua-
ble and exclusive franchises upon their grantees, and it was consid-
ered that, as the franchises were granted by the state, they could be
vacated or forfeited only in a proceeding by the state; that their lives
depend upon the action of the state or the stockholders as a whole.
The reason for this rule has entirely ceased in respect to the ordinary
business corporation formed under general laws, the privileges con-
ferred upon which are open to all who comply with statutory condi-
tions, which conditions are simple and formal in character and may
readily be complied with by any who desire to associate themselves
for the prosecution of any business venture.
5. See Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W.
1056 (1917) (power to dissolve a corporation created pursuant to statute is
analogous to the power to dissolve partnerships which also arises pursuant to
statute).
6. See F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 9.04 (1975).
7. See Note, The Continuing Viability of the Business Judgment Rule As A
Guidefor Judicial Restraint, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 562 (1967). Compare Iss-
ner v. Aldrich, 254 F. Supp. 696 (D. Del. 1966) (necessary to show that directors
have been guilty of misconduct) and Fornaseri v. Cosmosart Realty & Bldg.
Corp., 96 Cal. App. 549, 556, 274 P. 597, 600 (1929) (in absence of fraud, breach
of trust or ultra vires acts, directors are not subject to attack by minority for
discretionary acts performed in good faith) and Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (in absence of fraud or gross overreaching, majority's
decision to expand was a business judgment with which court could not in-
terfere) with Burt v. Irvine Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 828, 853, 47 Cal. Rptr. 392, 408
(1965) ("A director cannot close his eyes to what is going on about him in the
conduct of the business of the corporation and have it said that he is exercis-
ing business judgment .... [TJ hat means an honest, unbiased judgment, is
reasonably exercised by them.. .") (quoting Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d
625, 643 (1944)). For additional cases discussing the business judgment rule,
see Phinizy v. Anniston City Land Co., 195 Ala. 656, 71 So. 469 (1916); Graham-
Newman Corp. v. Franklin County Distilling Co., 26 Del. Ch. 233, 27 A.2d 142
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the principle of majority rule in corporation management, 8 they ef-
fectively prevented shareholders from obtaining relief by dissolu-
tion. Professor O'Neal has suggested, however, that neither of
these judicial theories are appropriately suited to the special
needs of the closely held corporation or its shareholders, and for
that reason should be applied with the utmost discrimination. 9 A
review of the case law of the last seventy years reveals that the
general rule existing at common law10 has been substantially abro-
gated and that courts, pursuant to the principles of equity, do dis-
solve solvent corporations in suits by minority shareholders."
In addition to judicial equitable remedies, virtually every state
has enacted legislation which permits involuntary dissolution of
corporations pursuant to actions brought by minority sharehold-
ers.12 The statutory schemes vary widely as to prerequisites for
action and matters of proof.' 3 They do, however, represent a con-
certed effort and recognition by the states that the perpetual exist-
ence of the corporate structure at common law is ill suited to the
functional realities of the closely held corporation.' 4
(1942); Stockholders of Jefferson County Agric. Ass'n v. Jefferson County
Agric. Ass'n, 155 Ia. 634, 136 N.W. 672 (1912); Stott Realty Co. v. Orloff, 262
Mich. 375, 247 N.W. 698 (1933).
8. But see Standard Int'l Corp. v. McDonald Printing Co., 13 Ohio Op. 2d 333, 159
N.E.2d 822 (1959) (sustaining the minority's issuance of additional stock pur-
suant to a power contained in the articles of incorporation, an act which effec-
tively blocked the sale of the corporation proposed by majority
shareholders).
9. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 6, § 9.04.
10. See note 2 & accompanying text supra.
11. See § II of text infra.
12. See § IV of text infra. Section 94 of the Model Business Corporation Act,
which has been adopted by a majority of the states, permits the state attor-
ney general to bring a quo warranto action for involuntary corporate dissolu-
tion when it is established that
(a) The corporation has failed to file its annual report within the
time required by this Act, or has failed to pay its franchise tax on or
before the first day of August of the year in which such franchise tax
becomes due and payable; or
(b) The corporation procured its articles of incorporation
through fraud;- or
(c) The corporation has continued to exceed or abuse the au-
thority conferred upon it by law; or
(d) The corporation has failed for thirty days to appoint and
maintain a registered agent in this State; or
(e) The corporation has failed for thirty days after change of its
registered office or registered agent to file in the office of the Secre-
tary of State a statement of such change.
ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act § 94(a)-(e) (1974) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
ACT].
13. See § IV of text infra.
14. See Hall v. Nieukirk, 12 Idaho 33, 85 P. 485 (1906); Gibbs v. Morgan, 9 Idaho
100, 72 P. 733 (1903).
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This comment discusses involuntary dissolution of the closely
held corporation' 5 in shareholder suits based on deadlock 16 or dis-
sension among the directors or the shareholders of the corpora-
tion. A discussion of three general areas will be used to present a
practical view of the current state of the law regarding deadlock
and involuntary corporate dissolution: (1) dissolution of the corpo-
ration under principles of equity, (2) state legislative response to
the problem of deadlock; and (3) an analysis of deadlock under the
statutes.
II. BACKGROUND
In this comment, a closely held corporation' 7 is defined as "a
corporation where management and ownership are substantially
identical to the extent that the independent judgment of directors
is, in fact, a fiction."' 8 The term deadlock as used in this comment
will refer to two situations that arise often in the close corpora-
tion.19 The first situation occurs when an even-numbered board of
directors is equally divided on management issues and an impasse
results. This form of deadlock is made complete when the share-
15. See note 18 & accompanying text infra.
16. For cases illustrating classic examples of deadlock, see Cowin v. Salmon, 248
Ala. 580, 28 So. 2d 633 (1946); Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577
(1964); Bowen v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., 114 Kan. 95, 217 P. 301
(1923); Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162
N.W. 1056 (1917); Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1965); In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954).
17. For statutes defining "closely held corporation," see DEL CODE tit. 8, § 342
(1975); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 13-A, § 102(5) (1974); MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.
art. 23, §§ 100(a), 103(a) (1973); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-4 (Vernon
Supp. 1978).
18. Israels, supra note 1, at 778. This oft quoted definition avoids the issues of
corporation size and the number of shareholders. Another leading writer in
the area would further define a close corporation as one
whose shares are not generally traded in the securities markets.
This definition seems to be most nearly in accord with the linguistic
usages of the legal profession: for instance, lawyers do not commonly
exclude a corporation from the category of close corporations solely
because some of its shareholders are not active in management.
1 F. O'NEA1 , CLOSE CORPORATIONS §§ 1.02 to .03 (1958). For a discussion of
deadlock in the close corporation, however, Mr. Israels' definition more
clearly illustrates why the situation of deadlock is especially paralyzing to its
business affairs.
For judicial definitions of close corporations, see Brooks v. Willcuts, 78
F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir. 1935); Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583
(1964); Thisted v. Tower Mngm't Corp., 147 Mont. 1, 14, 409 P.2d 813, 820 (1965);
In re Pivot Punch & Die Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 713, 715-16, 182 N.Y.S.2d 459, 462
(1959); Rogers Walla Walla, Inc., v. Ballard, 16 Wash. App. 81, 90 n.9, 553 P.2d
1372, 1378 n.9 (1976).
19. 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 18, § 9.02.
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holders are also equally divided and unable to terminate the man-
agement stalemate. The second deadlock situation is caused by a
"hold-over" board of directors. In this situation, the board of direc-
tors has an uneven membership with the majority, of course, con-
trolling the corporate management. When the shareholders are
evenly divided and are unable to vote in a new board of directors,
the faction represented by the existing majority of directors con-
tinues to control the corporation indefinitely.
As the foregoing situations demonstrate, deadlock can be espe-
cially disabling in the closely held corporation in which manage-
ment and investors are generally the same individuals. 20
Typically, shareholders invest their total assets in the corpora-
tion.2 1 Quite naturally, they have a paramount concern in the vi-
tality of the business and expect to address this concern by active
participation in corporate management. This factor, coupled with
the fact that shareholders are generally employees of the corpora-
tion, intensifies the interest of the parties. An organizational struc-
ture of this nature-in which the investment interests are
interwoven with continuous, often daily, interaction among the
principals-necessarily requires substantial trust among the indi-
viduals.22 Once this cooperation has been undermined,23 the ten-
sions are aggravated because of the need for continued contact to
promote business and to protect financial investments. The statu-
torily imposed perpetual existence of the corporation becomes
clearly abhorrent in this situation and some means of extraction
becomes necessary.
In contrast to the rights given partners under the Uniform Part-
nership Act,24 shareholders do not have powers to dissolve the en-
20. Id. In J. TINGLE, supra note 2, at 75-76, the author draws a distinction be-
tween incomplete and complete deadlock. Incomplete deadlock occurs when
the stockholders control the majority of an odd-numbered board of directors.
The corporation continues to function, representing the controlling faction
and perpetuating itself at each election of the board. Complete deadlock oc-
curs when there is an even-numbered board and shareholders and directors
divide equally on corporate decisions.
21. See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 18, § 1.07.
22. See In re Pivot Punch & Die Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 713, 182 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1959).
23. For a discussion of the factors that cause dissension, see F. O'NEAL & J. DER-
WIN, EXPULSION OR OPPREssIoN OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS §§ 2.01 to 2.19
(1961).
24. (1) On application by or for a partner the court shall decree a disso-
lution whenever.
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any judicial pro-
ceeding or is shown to be of unsound mind,
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of performing
his part of the partnership contract,
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends to affect
prejudicially the carrying on of the business,
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terprise and redeem their investments. While the usual way of
ending a relationship with the corporation is to sell one's interest,
the close corporation shareholder is at a disadvantage because
such interests are generally unmarketable.25 Moreover, the lack of
an available market for the shares may be intensified if the dissen-
sion motivating the sale is apparent to the prospective buyer.
Shareholders are further restrained from selling their investments
in the corporation if they do not own a controlling share of the
business. In addition, they may have contractually restricted the
alienation of the shares, effectively reducing the number of poten-
tial purchasers. Because of the unique character of the close cor-
poration and its shareholders, there is an obvious need to
restructure the law and its judicial application to provide a remedy
for shareholders who, because of deadlock or dissension, now risk
the loss of their investments in an enterprise that no longer func-
tions in the manner originally contemplated.
The corporate structure is a popular and commonly used form
of organizing business interests. 26 Its benefits are limited liability
accorded the principals and possible tax advantages. 27 Unfortu-
nately, the corporate structure which best suits the needs of the
publicly held corporation has distinct disadvantages when applied
to the closely held corporation.2 8 As a result, numerous commen-
tators have devoted substantial time to suggesting reforms that
would retain the benefits, yet better adapt the corporate form to
the special needs of the closely held corporation which is in effect
a "partnership type" business. 29 Of particular interest are the rec-
(d) A partner willfully or persistently commits a breach of the
partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters
relating to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practica-
ble to carry on the business in partnership with him,
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried on at a
loss,
(f) Other circumstances render a dissolution equitable.
UIFoRM PARTNERsHIP ACT § 32(a)-(f) (1969). See In re Pivot Punch & Die
Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 713, 714-15, 182 N.Y.S.2d 459, 462 (1959). In Hanes v. Wat-
kins, 63 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1953), the court initially addressed whether the busi-
ness arrangement was a partnership or a corporation. If it was the latter, the
facts did not support dissolution under the more stringent standard for corpo-
rate dissolution. See note 68 infra.
25. See 1 F. O'NEA , supra note 18, § 1.07. But see Hazen, The Decision to Incorpo-
rate, 58 NEB. L. REv. 627 (1979).
26. 1 F. O'NEAT, supra note 18, § 1.07.
27. Id.
28. Id. § 1.12.
29. Hetherington, Special Characteristics, Problems, and Needs of the Close Cor-
poration, 1969 U. ILL LF. 1; Hornstein, supra note 4; Israels, supra note 1;
Comment, Dissolution at Suit of a Minority Stockholder, supra note 3; Note,
Relief to Oppressed Minorities in Close Corporations: Partnership Precepts
and Related Considerations, 1974 Ariz. St. L.J. 409; Note, Deadlock and Disso-
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ommendations for agreements among the shareholders at or prior
to incorporation that provide for a specific course of action in the
event of deadlock.30 These prior agreements are, of course, advan-
tageous because they provide an orderly and non-litigious means
of effecting the shareholders' expectations at times of deadlock
when the making of such agreements would ordinarily be impossi-
ble.31
Generally, judicial dissolution of the corporation has been
viewed as drastic and, therefore, a remedy of last resort.32 While
dissolution was a necessary judicial response, and more recently a
legislative response, to serious corporate dysfunction, it is a rem-
edy that requires the court to carefully scrutinize the facts. The
effects of dissolution on all parties of the corporation are usually
harsh. There are generally no winners in the financial sense. This
is especially true since the value of the on-going business typically
exceeds the value received on liquidation,33 and its dissolution
may have a negative effect on the local economy. As a result, sev-
eral states have enacted statutes authorizing alternatives to disso-
lution.3 Nevertheless, dissolution is an appropriate response to
some cases of corporate dysfunction. It is an effective device for
remedying the occasional misuse of the corporate form to defraud,
lution: Problems in the Closely Held Corporation in Illinois, 56 N.W. U. I
REV. (1961).
30. See also 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 18, §§ 9.03 to 9.11.
31. The topic of discussion in this comment, however, is the situation in which
these prior agreements have not been made between the principals, and the
shareholders of a deadlocked corporation must necessarily look to equitable
principles or state statutes for relief.
32. See Hockenberger v. Curry, 191 Neb. 404, 215 N.W.2d 627 (1974). In Hocken-
berger, the court stated:
The Business Corporation Act has given to the courts the power to
relieve minority shareholders from oppressive acts of the majority,
but the remedy of liquidation is so drastic that it must be invoked
with extreme caution. The ends of justice would not be served by too
broad an application of the statute, for that would merely eliminate
one evil by substituting a greater one-oppression of the majority by
the minority.
Id. at 406, 215 N.W.2d at 628 (quoting Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37
Ill. App. 2d 29, 36, 184 N.E.2d 792, 795 (1962)). See State ex rel. Makar v. St.
Joseph County Circuit Court, 242 Ind. 339, 347, 179 N.E.2d 285, 289-90 (1962)
(court was reluctant to appoint a receiver because "[t] he action affects one of
man's most cherished and sacred rights guaranteed by the United States
Constitution-the right to be secure in his property"). See also Stott Realty
Co. v. Orlaff, 262 Mich. 375, 381, 247 N.W. 698, 699 (1933) ('"The ultimate test of
dissolution is that, with any other remedy, the corporation cannot be made to
function for the purpose of its creation.").
33. See, e.g., Lebold v. Inland S.S. Co., 82 F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1936).
34. CAT CORP. CODE § 308 (West Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 353 (1975); GA.
CODE ANN. § 22-703 (1977); Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.323 (1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 1384 (Purdon Supp. 1978). See 2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 18, §§ 9.30 to 9.31.
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oppress, 35 or cause deadlock. "Not only private rights and elemen-
tal principles of contract, but also the economic health of the coun-
try and consequently the public interest call for the winding-up of
a corporation when it is just and equitable."36
III. INVOLUNTARY CORPORATE DISSOLUTION IN THE
COURTS OF EQUITY
Prior to the development of specific dissolution statutes, the ag-
grieved shareholder's recourse was to petition a court of equity for
relief. Until the late nineteenth century, however, the shareholder
was precluded from obtaining dissolution because of the common
law rule that, absent statutory authority, a court of equity had no
power to dissolve a solvent corporation.3 7
In 1892, in the landmark case Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co.,38 the
Michigan Supreme Court rejected the common law rule and held
that when a corporation has "utterly failed at its purpose, not be-
cause of matters beyond its control, but because of fraudulent mis-
management and misappropriation of its funds, '39 a court of equity
may wind up a solvent corporation. The holding in Miner was
grounded on the principle that to continue a corporation whose
purpose could no longer be attained was a breach by the majority
of the charter contract. 40 The court cited authority which held that
majority shareholders had a duty to terminate the enterprise
when, due to external conditions, its chartered purposes could not
35. In addition to deadlock, MODEL ACT § 97(a) (2), (4) provides for dissolution in
cases of fraud, oppression, and misapplication of assets. This comment will
be concerned with these grounds only to the extent that the courts require
the presence of these factors before dissolution is granted on deadlock
grounds. See note 72 & accompanying text infra.
For cases interpreting the above factors in dissolution proceedings, see
Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 IlM. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962);
Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrogated Box Co., 20 Ill, 208, 170 N.E.2d 131 (1960); Hock-
enberger v. Curry, 191 Neb. 404, 215 N.W.2d 627 (1974); Baker v. Commerical
Body Builders, Inc., 262 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973); White v. Perkins, 213 Va.
129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972). See also Comment, Oppression as a Statutory
Ground for Corporate Dissolution, 1965 DUKE L.J. 128; Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 358
(1974).
36. Hornstein, supra note 4, at 249.
37. See note 2 & accompanying text supra.
38. 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892). See J. TINGLE, supra note 2, at 17-20, 32-40
(discussion of Miner).
39. 93 Mich. at 117, 53 N.W. at 224. In Miner, plaintiff and defendant, partners in
an ice selling business, formed a corporation. During a period of growing dis-
sension, defendant purchased enough shares to gain majority control. De-
fendant forced plaintiff from his position as president, terminated dividends,
substantially increased his own salary and entered into a favorable contract
with the corporation.
40. Id. at 113, 53 N.W. at 223.
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be attained.4 ' By an extension of that principle, the court in Miner
created a jural relationship-a fiduciary duty running from the ma-
jority to the minority shareholders to wind up the corporation
when the majority or the controlling faction makes it impossible to
attain the corporation's original purposes.42 Modifications of this
rule have been applied in cases subsequent to Miner to empower a
court of equity to involuntarily dissolve a corporation.
In some jurisdictions a shareholder could sue in equity for a
distribution of the corporate assets where the corporation's pur-
poses had completely failed.4 3 However, the bill to dissolve was
considered by some courts insufficient if it did not contain an alle-
gation that a prior demand had been made on the majority to cor-
rect the wrongs.44 It was clear, however, that the fact that a
41. Authority for the court's holding was Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co., 27 F. 625
(S.D.N.Y. 1886). In Ervin, the majority shareholders rather than the minority
sought to dissolve the corporation. While there was statutory authority in
Oregon for this action, "nevertheless [the majority] had no right to exercise
their control over the corporate management for purposes of appropriating
the property or its assets to themselves, to the exclusion of a minority, or
without rendering them a fair return." Id. at 625. Quoting Ervin, the court in
Miner stated-
Plainly, the defendants have assumed to exercise a power belonging
to the majority, in order to secure personal profit for themselves,
without regard to the interests of the minority. They repudiate the
suggestion of fraud, and plant themselves upon their right as a ma-
jority to control the corporate interests according to their discretion.
They err if they suppose that a court of equity will tolerate a discre-
tion which does not consult the interests of the minority. It cannot
be denied that minority stockholders are bound hand and foot to the
majority in all matters of legitimate administration of the corporate
affairs; and the courts are powerless to redress many forms of op-
pression, practiced upon the minority under a guise of legal sanction,
which fall short of actual fraud. This is a consequence of the implied
contract of association, by which it is agreed in advance that a major-
ity shall bind the whole body as to all transactions within the scope
of the corporate powers. But it is also of the essence of the contract
that the corporate powers shall only be exercised to accomplish the
objects for which they were called into existence, and that the major-
ity shall not control those powers to pervert or destroy the original
purposes of the corporators ....
93 Mich. at 114,53 N.W. at 223 (quoting Ervin v. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co., 27 F. at
630-31).
42. See J. TINGLE, supra note 2, at 36.
43. Ross v. American Banana Co., 150 Ala. 268,43 So. 817 (1907); Noble v. Gadsden
Land & Improvement Co., 133 Ala. 250, 31 So. 856 (1902); Bowen v. Bowen-
Romer Flour Mills Corp., 114 Kan. 95,217 P. 301 (1923); Thwing v. Minowa Co.,
134 Minn. 148, 158 N.W. 820 (1916). Noble involved a corporation organized to
build a town on a piece of land it owned. When adverse economic conditions
occurred, plans for the town went awry. The cost to the shareholders of
maintaining the idle land was substantial.
44. Ross v. American Banana Co., 150 Ala. 268, 43 So. 817 (1907); Ulmer v. Maine
Real-Estate Co., 93 Me. 324,45 A. 40 (1899); Hyman Mercantile v. Kiersky, 192
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corporation had not paid dividends was not sufficient to grant dis-
solution; the corporation had to have failed in the purposes for
which it was chartered.45 This failure could be evidenced by a fail-
ure to call shareholder meetings for five years prior to dissolu-
tion.46 One jurisdiction held that if the objects of the corporation
were no longer attainable and if the continued operation would be
ruinous to the investors, a shareholder could obtain dissolution. 47
While the failure of corporate purposes had been held sufficient
grounds for dissolution, "[i] t [was] not enough that the past prose-
cution of the corporate enterprise or business ha[d] been a
financial failure, nor [was] it enough that its future prosecution
[would] probably be devoid of profit, however strong the
probability [might] seem."48 The court refused to inject its busi-
ness judgment into a going concern so long as the original corpo-
rate purposes were being pursued.49 This rule was in accord with
other holdings that a court of equity has no power to dissolve a
corporation merely because of minority dissatisfaction and differ-
ences of opinion as to management of a failing business. 50 Upon
becoming a shareholder, the minority impliedly agreed that man-
Miss. 195,4 So. 2d 881 (1941). But see Ponca Mill Co. v. Mikesell, 55 Neb. 98, 75
N.W. 46 (1898) (a prior demand on the majority is not required when all the
majority have been alleged guilty of fraud). See also Guaranty Laundry Co.
v. Pulliam, 200 Okla. 185, 191 P.2d 975 (1948).
45. Central Land Co. v. Sullivan, 152 Ala. 360, 44 So. 644 (1907). The court distin-
guished this case from Noble. In Noble the cost of maintaining the idle land
was to sacrifice the assets of the corporation. In Central Land Co. the income
was considered the same as the cost. It was clear, however, that the court
looked to the future when the cost would eventually exceed the income. 152
Ala. at 365, 44 So. at 645. The rule applied in Noble, Ross, and Central Land
Co. (permitting dissolution by the minority shareholder when the corporate
purposes were no longer fulfilled whether or not solvent) was in accord with
the rule existing prior to Miner; there was a duty to dissolve the corporation
when due to external conditions, the original purposes of the charter could no
longer be fulilled.
46. Central Land Co. v. Sullivan, 152 Ala. 360, 366, 44 So. 644, 645 (1907).
47. Brennan v. Rollman, 151 Va. 715, 145 S.E. 260 (1928).
48. Phinizy v. Anniston City Land Co., 195 Ala. 656, 661, 71 So. 469, 471 (1916). See
Altoona Warehouse Co. v. Bynum, 242 Ala. 540,7 So. 2d 497 (1942); Dixie Lum-
ber Co. v. Hellams, 202 Ala. 488, 490, 80 So. 872, 874 (1919) (dissolution denied
because it could not be said with moral certainty that continuing would result
in serious loss or eventual ruin). Compare Johnston v. Livingston Nursing
Home, Inc., 282 Ala. 309, 211 So. 2d 151 (1968). See note 58 infra.
49. See note 7 & accompanying text supra.
50. See Platner v. Kirby, 133 Ia. 259, 115 N.W. 1032 (1908); Theodora Holding Corp.
v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969); Troutman v. Council Bluffs Street
Fair & Carnival Co., 142 Ia. 140, 120 N.W. 730 (1909) (suit to wind-up a corpora-
tion must be for the benefit of the corporation and not to assert a share-
holder's individual right).
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agement of corporate affairs would be with the majority.51
Nevertheless, it has been held that a court may dissolve a cor-
poration where its affairs have been so mismanaged that failure or
ruin is inevitable.5 2 In addition, courts have approved dissolution
of a losing business when it was found that the majority had vio-
lated its fiduciary duty in refusing to dissolve the hopeless busi-
ness which had been kept alive solely for the continued pecuniary
benefit of the majority.53 This is in accord with the rule that mem-
bers of the controlling faction become trustees of the property for
the benefit of the minority when they act fraudulently by diverting
the corporate assets to themselves. 54 Similarly, dissolution has
been held appropriate on a showing of gross mismanagement of
51. First Nat'l Bank of Waterloo v. Fireproof Storage Bldg. Co., 199 Ia. 1285, 1293,
202 N.W. 14, 17-18 (1925).
52. Taylor v. Decatur Mineral & Land Co., 112 F. 449 (N.D. Ala. 1901); Hall v.
Nieukirk, 12 Idaho 33, 85 P. 485 (1906); Graham v. McAdoo, 135 Ky. 677, 123
S.W. 260 (1909); Ulmer v. Maine-Real-Estate Co., 93 Me. 324, 45 A. 40 (1899);
Hyman Mercantile Co. v. Kiersky, 192 Miss. 195, 4 So. 2d 881 (1941) (for a
minority shareholder to put an end to a corporation there must be either in-
solvency or mismanagement which leads to insolvency).
53. Kroger v. Jaburg, 231 A.D. 641, 248 N.Y.S. 387 (1931). See Tansey v. Oil Pro-
ducing Royalties, Inc., 36 Del. Ch. 472, 133 A.2d 141 (1957). In Tansey, the
court appointed a liquidating receiver. The corporation, the basic purpose of
which was to purchase and retain oil royalties, held $20,000 worth of such
royalties. However, it had been 25 years since the last purchase and the cor-
poration had been kept alive as a vehicle for the majority's personal conven-
ience in handling financial affairs.
See also Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102
(1963). In Leibert, the minority shareholder claimed that the majority was
continuing the existence of the corporation only for the purpose of diverting
assets into the parent corporation; and to force the minority shareholder to
sell his interest at a substantial loss. These facts were enough to state a
cause of action for dissolution at the suit of the minority. Id. at 315, 196
N.E.2d at 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d at 104. In a case subsequent to Leibert, Nelkin v.
H.J.R. Realty Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 543, 255 N.E.2d 713, 307 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1969), the
same court held dissolution inappropriate. The majority was not guilty of
wrongful diversion of corporate property but rather was simply complying
with an agreement entered into by all the shareholders that called for the
majority to pay low rents to the corporation. In Albright v. Fulton County
Home Builders, 152 Ga. 485, 107 S.E. 335 (1921), the corporation was estab-
lished to build and sell houses. While the minority alleged that the corpora-
tion was dead, the court found a mere suspension of operations "to await
developments of a change in the financial condition of the community." Id. at
488, 107 S.E. at 336. The majority had not breached its fiduciary duty to dis-
solve. The minority needed to show illegal acts of the majority to be success-
ful.
54. Morse v. Metropolitan S.S. Co., 87 N.J. Eq. 217, 221, 100 A. 219,221 (1917). The
court stated that under ordinary circumstances the majority may vote as self-
interest requires. In these instances, the fiduciary relationship does not ap-
ply. However, the majority's power is not unlimited and that relationship will
be invoked when the majority divides among themselves the corporate prop-
erty to the exclusion of the others.
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business affairs and misappropriation of corporate property to the
majority-necessarily jeopardizing the shareholders' interests.5 5
In contrast, a court has held that absent allegations of mismanage-
ment or fraud, dissolution was inappropriate in the case of a sol-
vent going concern merely because of the minority's complaint
about procedures for electing the board of directors.5 6
Generally, courts, in the absence of specific statutory authority,
have refused to decree dissolution solely on the grounds of dead-
lock or dissension existing among directors or shareholders.
"Bickerings and disputes" between two factions each owning fifty
percent interests in an effectively operating company fell "far
short of demanding the intervention of the court to protect the
stockholders' interests. '5 7 This is consistent with the holding of
55. Thwing v. Minowa Co., 134 Minn. 148, 158 N.W. 820 (1916); Brent v. B.E. Brister
Sawmill Co., 103 Miss. 876, 60 So. 1018 (1913); Ponca Mill Co. v. Mikesell, 55
Neb. 98, 75 N.W. 46 (1898); Exchange Bank v. Bailey, 29 Okla. 246, 116 P. 812
(1911). But see Stott Realty Co. v. Orloff, 262 Mich. 375, 247 N.W. 698 (1933). In
Stott dissolution was held inappropriate in a suit brought by shareholders
owning less than two-sevenths of the stock. The majority did not act fraudu-
lently, misappropriate corporate assets, manage incompetently, nor fail to
continue the corporate purpose. That the majority did not foresee the onset
of the depression was excusable; "hard times" are not a ground for dissolu-
tion.
56. Hepner v. Miller, 130 Colo. 243, 274 P.2d 818 (1954). The facts in Hepner make
it difficult to reconcile the holding. In this case, the shares were equally di-
vided between the Miller and Hepner families. Lillian Hepner and A.J. Hep-
ner served as president and secretary-treasurer respectively. O.L. Miller was
vice-president. Dissension arose between the two families so that in the
years 1951 and 1952 there was an even division of the votes in the election of
the board of directors. In 1952, Miller received notice from A.J. Hepner that
he was removed as corporate manager, and the bank in which the corporate
funds were placed was notified that Miller had no authority to withdraw
them. As half owners, the Millers were denied any voice in management.
The court denied dissolution because there was no allegation of mismanage-
ment or fraud. Dissolution was disfavored because it bore "the same rela-
tionship to a corporation that a sentence of death bears to a natural person."
Id. at 247, 274 P.2d at 819.
57. Dorf v. Hill Bus Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 444, 54 A.2d 761, 763 (1947). In Dof, the
dissension extended over five years. In 1942, defendant began to take over
the running of the business, refusing to discuss policy matters with plaintiffs.
Defendant's conduct of '"running the show was further illustrated by humili-
ating the plaintiff in the presence of employees, indicating that he, the de-
fendant, was "the boss." 54 A.2d at 762. But see Johnston v. Livingston Nurs-
ing Home, Inc., 282 Ala. 309, 211 So. 2d 151 (1968). In Johnston, there was sub-
stantial dissension between two sisters regarding the management of a
nursing home. The interests were split equally-50 shares to Johnston and 49
shares to Vick plus 1 share to Vick's husband. The court found no fraud or
oppression and held the quarrels to be "an expression of human nature" that
"are temporary and are ironed out with the passing of time." Id. at 312, 211
So.2d at 154. The dissension alone was not sufficient for dissolution.
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the Delaware Supreme Court that "[m] ere dissension among cor-
porate stockholders seldom, if ever, justifie [d] the appointment of
a receiver for a solvent corporation." 58 Trivial disagreements as to
maintenance, customer relations, job assignments, and entertain-
ment were not enough to decree dissolution when the corporation
had not "practically discontinued all of its business."5 9
It has also been held that in the absence of irreparable injury to
the corporation, dissolution will not be granted on grounds of
deadlock.60 In addition, it has been held that the beneficial inter-
ests of the shareholders must be served by the appointment of a
receiver before the court will act; the existence of deadlock by it-
self is not sufficient for dissolution.6 1 It was considered that if
some hope existed that the corporation would become profitable, it
would not serve the interests of the shareholders to grant dissolu-
tion.62
Recognizing that deadlock and dissension are generally the first
steps in corporate turmoil, some jurisdictions have permitted dis-
solution when deadlock and dissension have been coupled with
one faction's oppressive control over management or use of exclu-
sionary techniques against the minority.63 Similarly, when dissen-
58. Hall v. John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 244,250, 163 A.2d 288, 293
(1960). The court went on to say that the shareholder's remedy was to sell his
interest, id., a dubious solution considering the special problems of closely
held corporations. See note 25 & accompanying text supra. In Hall the issue
of deadlock had become moot at the time of trial. Therefore, there was no
discussion of the facts under the relevant Delaware statute authorizing disso-
lution in instances of deadlock.
See also Murray-Baumgartner Surgical Instr. Co. v. Requardt, 180 Md. 245,
23 A.2d 697 (1942). In Murray, the court distinguished between a deadlocked
corporation and a situation of mere dissension. The former occurs when, as a
result of shareholder decision or indecision, the corporation cannot conduct
its affairs. Id. at 253, 23 A.2d at 700. As long as there were no allegations of
fraud or illegality, and the corporation was functioning, the court would not
provide a remedy.
59. Freedman v. Fox, 67 So. 2d 692, 693 (Fla. 1953).
60. Lush'us Brand Distribs., Inc. v. Fort Dearborn Lithograph Co., 330 IMl. App.
216, 224, 70 N.E.2d 737, 741 (1947).
61. Reid Drug Co. v. Salyer, 268 Ky. 522, 530, 105 S.W.2d 625, 629 (1937). In Reid
Drug Co., the two plaintiffs purchased a half interest in a drug store with the
balance of the interests in the hands of the two defendants. When the drug
store proved unprofitable, plaintiffs petitioned for dissolution because of mis-
management. Id. at 526, 105 S.W.2d at 627. There were no allegations of
fraudulent mismanagement.
62. Id. at 530, 105 S.W.2d at 629.
63. Bowen v. Bowen-Romer Flour Mills Corp., 114 Kan. 95, 217 P. 301 (1923):
If Plaintiffs do not constitute a majority of the stockholders, neither
are they a minority. Because the stockholders are in a deadlock, the
vacancy in the board of directors cannot be filled. Because of the
deadlock in the board, the corporation has no managing body, as the
law requires. No lawfully authorized and directed step can be taken
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sion and deadlock have coexisted with fraudulent mismanagement
and misappropriation of assets by the majority, dissolution has
been granted.6 Moreover, evidencing a retreat from the fraud and
mismanagement standard adopted in many jurisdictions,65 it has
been held that dissension coupled with financial loss, deadlock,
mismanagement and deterioration of property was sufficient for a
court to decree dissolution. 66 While it was generally recognized
that deadlock and dissension alone were insufficient for dissolu-
tion, when these factors were so serious as to result in the failure
of corporate functions or purposes, a court could grant dissolution
of the corporation in a suit by a minority shareholder.67
to achieve the corporate purposes. One group of belligerents has
possession of the corporate property and control of its business af-
fairs, and is taking advantage of the opportunity to oppress the other
group. Must this situation continue until the period of corporate
existence expires, or until Bowen, unable to stand the financial
strain, must sell his stock to Romer at Romer's price, and so be fro-
zen out?
Id. at 98-99, 217 P. at 303.
64. Green v. National Advertising & Amusement Co., 137 Minn. 65, 162 N.W. 1056
(1917). The court described the incomplete deadlock as follows:
This [costly litigation] apparently has led to irreconcilable differ-
ences, mutual hostility and enmity even between brother and sister,
plaintiff and Mrs. Barnet, disclosing a situation which will preclude
an amicable operation of the affairs of the corporation in the interests
of all concerned. This is shown by the arbitrary action of the defend-
ants in taking and receiving excessive compensation for their serv-
ices, as well as their apparent determination wholly to exclude
plaintiff from the company. They were elected managing officers at a
time when the friction was less intense, and by reason of the equal
division of the stock they are secure in their positions, and in the
right to continue the management of the company to the exclusion of
plaintiff, unless the court shall step in and relieve the situation.
Id. at 68, 162 N.W. at 1057.
65. See Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892).
66. Levant v. Kowal, 350 Mich. 232, 86 N.W.2d 336 (1957).
67. Flemming v. Heffner & Flemming, 263 Mich. 561, 568, 248 N.W. 900, 902 (1933).
See Hammond v. Hammond, 216 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). Hammond
was an unusual case because the Hammonds had been divorced and the de-
cree had awarded them each a 50% interest in the corporation. The court
disallowed dissolution at the time of the appeal with an order to see if the
differences between the Hammonds could be resolved. However, if the dis-
sension could not be resolved and it was of "such nature as [to] seriously
threaten to impair the successful operation of the corporation," dissolution
would be permitted at that time. 216 S.W.2d at 634. See Cowin v. Salmon, 248
Ala. 580, 28 So. 2d 633 (1946); Guaranty Laundry Co. v. Pullam, 200 Okla. 185,
191 P.2d 974 (1948); Wood v. Myers Paper Co., 3 Tenn. App. 128 (1926). In
Pulliam the court stated:
There is no question but that the management of the company is
hopelessly deadlocked. Both parties are in agreement on this. The
dissension between the two groups of stockholders is such that direc-
tors' meetings are not called, and the board could not function if
meetings were held, by reason of the equal division in voting
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The deviation of the equity courts from the rule existing at com-
mon law illustrated not only a rejection of the old principle that a
corporation could only be dissolved by an agent of the state, but
also showed an increasing awareness that the operation of corpo-
rations, and especially close corporations, presented special
problems that no longer were adequately addressed by the com-
mon law rule.68
1Il. DEADLOCK STATUTES
A. The First Statutes and The Model Act
In a response to the growing number of exceptions to the rule
that a court of equity has no power absent statutory authorization
to dissolve a solvent corporation, states began to adopt provisions
delineating the specific grounds for judicially imposed corporate
dissolution. New York's legislature addressed very early the prob-
lem of dissolution upon deadlock of a corporation.6 9 Prior to 1933,
strength. It is clear that the governing body is in such condition that
it is presently impossible for the company to carry on its business
advantageously to the stockholders. Although now a solvent con-
cern, this-stuation cannot long prevail in the face of internal troubles
known to the public, and seriously affecting the company affairs as
well as the public exploitation.
Id. at 191, 191 P.2d at 981.
See also State ex rel. Conlan v. Oudin & Bergman Fire Clay Mining & Mfg.
Co., 48 Wash. 196, 93 P. 219 (1908). The litigation in Oudin represented the
eighth appeal to the same court by the parties because of dissension. The
court saw "no reason for not dissolving this corporation, which for over four
years has been impotent and unable to legally transact any business on ac-
count of the controversy and ill feeling existing between the parties who own,
each, half of the stock." Id. at 198, 93 P. at 220. In Hanes v. Watkins, 63 So. 2d
625, 628 (Fla. 1953), the court held dissolution inappropriate because there
was no evidence "that there [was] such a deadlock between stockholders
that the affairs of the corporation may not be legally transacted." The real
concern was over the dissension, not the deadlock, existing between two
shareholders, one of which owned 51% and the other 49% of the business.
Under this split of ownership, the business could continue to flourish as it
had done, clearly indicating no failure of corporate purposes.
68. The initial response of state legislatures was to create statutes that were gen-
erally more tailored to the considerations of the large publicly held corpora-
tions. Because of the striking differences in organization and operation
between publicly held and close corporations, the latter's problems were mis-
handled or unanswered. See 1 F. O'NEAL, supra note 18, § 1.13. By 1960,
states began adopting statutory provisions which guaranteed a new flexibility
in corporate form, an element greatly needed because of the partnership
characteristic of the close corporation. Id. § 1.14.
69. 1876 N.Y. Laws ch. 442. This statute enacted in 1876 read:
Whenever the trustees of a corporation... shall consist of an even
number of persons, and they shall be equally divided as to the man-
agement of the affairs of said corporation, and the whole stock of
such corporation, at the time of such disagreement, shall be owned
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Illinois permitted involuntary dissolution if the amorphous stan-
dard of "good cause" could be shown.70 In 1933, having repealed
the prior law, Illinois enacted a statute7 ' which became the fore-
runner of the Model Business Corporation Act.72 The deadlock
provision of this legislation read:
by the persons being the trustees, or so divided that one half thereof
be owned or controlled by persons favoring the course of half the
number of trustees, and the other half thereof by persons favoring
the course of the other half of the number of trustees, the supreme
court is hereby authorized in its discretion, upon the application of
the trustees or any or either of them, either upon petition or by ac-
tion, to dissolve said corporation, and to take charge of and wind up
its affairs, and for that purpose to appoint one or more receivers
thereof.
The New York legislature in 1896 amended the statue to cover incomplete
deadlock:
[O1r if the stock is so divided that one-half thereof is owned or con-
trolled by persons favoring the course of part of the trustees or direc-
tors and one-half thereof is owned by persons favoring the course of
the other trustees or directors the trustees or directors or stockhold-
ers or one or more of them may present a petition as prescribed in
the last section.
1896 N.Y. Laws ch. 569. See J. TiNGLE supra note 2, at 129.
70. 1871 Ill. Laws § 25, at 302, repealed 1919 Ill. Laws, at 349. See Note Deadlock
and Dissolution: Problems in the Closely Held Corporation in Illinois, 56 N.W.
U. L. REv. 525, 528 n.12 (1961), (stating that the good cause standard was given
a very strict interpretation as "the doing or refraining from doing some act
which shall subject the corporation to a forfeiture of its charter or corporate
power") (quoting Bixler v. Summerfield, 195 Ill. 147, 152, 62 N.E. 849, 851
(1902)). Deadlock was not covered by the "good cause" statute. See Gidwitz
v. Cohn, 238 IlL App. 227 (1925). See also Bator v. United Sausage Co., 138
Conn. 18, 21, 81 A.2d 442, 443 (1951). In Bator, the court interpreted CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 5226 (1949), which permitted dissolution "whenever any good
and sufficient reason exists for dissolution." Under this provision dissolution
could be granted if dissension among the corporation members was so severe
as to make it impossible to achieve the corporate purposes.
71. ILT. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86 (Smith-Hurd 1959).
72. The - courts shall have full power to liquidate the assets and
business of a corporation;
(a) In an action by a shareholder when it is established;
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the
corporate affairs and the shareholders are unable to break the dead-
lock, and that irreparable injury to the corporation is being suffered
or is threatened by reason thereof; or
(2) That the acts of the directors or those in control of the corpo-
ration are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent; or
(3) That the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power, and
have failed, for a period which includes at least two consecutive an-
nual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose terms have
expired or would have expired upon the election of their successors;
or
(4) That the corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted.
MODEL AcT § 97(a) (1)-(4).
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Courts of equity shall have full power to liquidate the assets and busi-
ness of a corporation:
(a) In an action by a shareholder when it is made to appear.
(1) That the directors are deadlocked in the management of the cor-
porate affairs and the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock, and
that irreparable injury to the corporation is being suffered or is threatened
by reason thereof .... 73
In 1951 the statute was amended by the Illinois legislature to add
the following provision permitting dissolution on proof of dead-
lock: "(2) That the shareholders are deadlocked in voting power,
and have failed, for a period which includes at least two consecu-
tive annual meeting dates, to elect successors to directors whose
term has expired or would have expired upon the election of their
successors .... 74 As amended the Illinois statute was identical to
the Model Business Corporation Act 75 which has become the basis
for involuntary corporate dissolution legislation in the majority of
the states.76 Section (a) (1) of the current Illinois statute77 repre-
sents the legislative solution to situations of complete deadlock,
i.e., an even-numbered board of directors with the voting powers
evenly split 78 between two factions of shareholders.
Section (a) (3) of the Illinois statute79 represents a solution to
incomplete deadlock which arises in the close corporation with
equally divided shareholder interests, but an odd-numbered board
of directors. When the evenly divided voting shares cannot agree
on the election of a new board, the holdovers, representing the
controlling faction's interests, continue to manage the corpora-
tion.8 0 Both forms of deadlock seriously threaten the right to cor-
porate management which is a right perceived by the investor to
be his upon entry into the business.
B. Variations on the Model Act
Virtually every state has enacted a statute permitting a minor-
ity shareholder to petition for dissolution of the corporation.8 1 The
73. ILT. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 § 157.86(a) (1) (Smith-Hurd 1959).
74. Id. § 157.86(a) (3).
75. See note 72 supra.
76. See notes 84-85 & accompanying text infra. The distinction between the two
deadlock provisions was discussed by Professor Tingle in his book on corpo-
rate dissolution and stockholders remedies. See J. TINGLE, supra note 2, at
75-76.
77. ILT. ANN. STAT. ch. 32 § 157.86(a) (1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
78. This effect, caused by the even division of voting shares, can also occur when
there are either charter or by-law provisions which increase the voting or
quorum requirements.
79. IW ANN. STAT. ch. 32 § 157.86(a) (3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
80. See J. TINGLE supra note 2, at 76.
81. All states except Texas and Idaho have enacted legislation permitting invol-
untary corporate dissolution in a suit by a shareholder.
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provisions for dissolution on deadlock as stated in the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act have been widely enacted by the states.82
The statutes differ, however, to the extent that dissolution is pro-
vided as a remedy for either complete or incomplete deadlock or
both. Statutes also differ on the need to demonstrate irreparable
injury to the corporation in either or both forms. In addition, a
number of states have statutes which bear little resemblance to
the language of the Model Act, and two states provide no specific
recourse for dissolution by the shareholder of the deadlocked cor-
poration.
For a complete discussion of the present status of corporate
deadlock litigation, it is important to analyze the current state stat-
utory schemes for dissolution. The exact language of the Model
Business Corporation Act provision on complete and incomplete
deadlock has been adopted in seventeen states.83 The Illinois stat-
ute discussed above 84 is representative of this language. It is help-
ful to note that under the section pertaining to complete deadlock,
dissolution is available as a remedy only if the petitioning share-
holder demonstrates that irreparable injury to the corporation is
either occurring or is threatening to occur. In the provision appli-
cable to incomplete deadlock, two consecutive annual shareholder
meetings must have passed without the election of new directors.
However, irreparable damage to the corporation need not be al-
leged in situations of incomplete deadlock.
Twenty-one states have enacted altered variations of the Model
Act provisions. For example, Georgia's statute, which otherwise
employs identical language to the Model Act, permits dissolution
in cases of complete deadlock only if it is impractical for the court
to appoint a provisional director.8 5 The Arkansas 86 and Florida87
82. See notes 84-85 & accompanying text infra.
83. ALASKA STAT. § 10.05.540(1),(3) (1968); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-8-113(2) (a)
(1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86(a)(1)-(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978);
IOWA CODE ANN. §496A.94(1)(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1978); KY. REv. STAT.
§ 271A.475 (1) (a)(1), (3) (Baldwin Supp. 1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-
193(a)(1), (3) (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2290(a)(1), (3) (1967);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2096 (Reissue 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-29-16(1) (a), (c)
(Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-21-16(1) (a)-(b) (1976); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 57.595(1) (a) (A), (C) (1977); S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 47-7-34(1), (3)
(1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-92(a) (1), (3) (1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 2067(a) (1) (A), (C) (1973); WASH. REV. CODE 23A.28.170(1) (a), (c) (1974);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §180.771(1)(a)(1), (4) (West 1957); Wyo. STAT. §7-1-
614(a) (i) (A), (C) (1977). Tennessee has reorganized its language, but the
substance is the same. TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1008(1) (a) (i)-(ii) (1964). See
note 72 supra.
84. See notes 73-80 & accompanying text supra.
85. GA. CODE § 22-1317(a) (1) (A), (C) (1977). Arizona's approach is similar to
Georgia's with regard to the appointment of a conservator. Under the Ari-
zona scheme, a conservator may be appointed in cases of deadlock upon the
application of any investor. ARiZ. REV. STAT. § 10-214 (1977). However, if the
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statutes are also identical to the Model Act except that in cases of
incomplete deadlock there is no requirement that two shareholder
meetings pass before dissolution will be granted. Hawaii requires
a demonstration of irreparable injury to the corporation for cases
of incomplete deadlock, a requirement reserved for complete dead-
lock under the Model Act.88 Several other states do not require a
showing of irreparable injury to the corporation before an award of
dissolution in cases of complete deadlock.89 Four states fail to ad-
dress incomplete deadlock. They provide a remedy only for com-
plete deadlock which results in irreparable injury to the
corporation. 90 In cases of either complete or incomplete deadlock,
Rhode Island requires proof that dissolution would be beneficial to
shareholders whether or not the business could be operated for a
profit.9 1 Similarly, North Carolina permits dissolution in cases of
deadlock of the internal affairs impairs or threatens to impair the value of the
assets and it would appear useless to invoke section 10-214, the superior court
has full power to liquidate. Id. § 10-215(1) (b).
86. Amc. STAT. ANN. § 64-908(A) (1), (3) (Supp. 1977) (adds irreparable injury test
to the incomplete deadlock provision).
87. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.274(1) (a) (1)-(2) (West 1977). The Virginia provision
also does not require that two voteless meetings pass. As in Arkansas, how-
ever, the shareholder deadlock must cause or threaten to cause irreparable
injury to the corporation before dissolution will be granted. VA. CODE § 13.1-
94(a)(1), (3) (1978).
88. HAw. REV. STAT. § 416-128(a) (1)-(2) (1976).
89. CONN. GEN. STAT. §33-382(a)(2)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 12:143(A) (4), (5) (West Supp. 1978). In addition, Connecticut's incomplete
deadlock provision permits dissolution if the shareholders are deadlocked in
the election of officers and "for that reason have been unable at the next
preceeding annual meeting to agree upon or vote for directors as successors
to directors whose term would normally have expired upon election of their
successors." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-382(a) (2) (ii) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis ad-
ded).
90. Aia. CODE tit. 10, § 21(78) (a) (1) (Cum. Supp. 1973); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-7-3
[25-242] (a) (5) (Burns 1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.485(1) (a) (Vernon 1966);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2107(A) (4) (Purdon 1967). Missouri's and Penn-
sylvania's provisions are identical to the Model Act whereas Alabama's, in a
more general fashion, reads: 'That the directors or stockholders are dead-
locked in the -management of the affairs of the corporation and irreparable
injury to the corporation is being suffered or threatened by reason thereof
.... " ALA. CODE. tit. 10, § 21(78) (a) (1) (Cum. Supp. 1973). The Indiana stat-
ute is very similar to the Alabama provision.
91. R.I. GEN. LAWs § 7-1.1-90(a) (1), (3) (1970). Michigan's statute provides for
dissolution in cases of complete and incomplete deadlock when the "corpora-
tion is unable to function effectively in the best interests of its creditors and
shareholders." MiCH. ComP. LAws. ANN. § 450.1823 (a)-(b) (1973). New
Jersey's statute tracks that of Michigan except with respect to the disagree-
ment over matters respecting management. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A.12-7(b)
(West 1978). Michigan requires that there be a disagreement over "material"
matters whereas New Jersey states "substantial' matters. In addition, New
Jersey has deleted the requirement that deadlock must cause the corporation
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complete deadlock when "the business can no longer be conducted
to the advantage of all the shareholders; '92 there is no requirement
of irreparable injury to the corporation. Maine and South Carolina
have incorporated North Carolina's approach, but added the irrep-
arable injury test for complete deadlock cases. 93 Massachusetts,
on the other hand, requires neither the benefit to shareholders nor
irreparable injury tests for complete deadlock nor that there be
two voteless annual shareholder meetings for incomplete dead-
lock. Instead, it requires the shareholder who brings the petition
to own not less than forty percent of the outstanding stock and be
entitled to vote.94 New York restricts the right to petition for disso-
lution in cases of complete deadlock or serious internal dissension
to holders of one-half of the outstanding shares, 95 but this prereq-
to be "unable to function and has added the requirement that the sharehold-
ers must have failed for two consecutive annual meetings to elect successors
to directors whose terms have expired." Id. § 14A: 12-7(a).
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a) (1) (1975). In addition, North Carolina's incom-
plete deadlock provision tracks exactly the Model Act except dissolution is
not allowed where deadlock has resulted from "special provisions or arrange-
ments designed to create veto power among the shareholders." Id. § 55-
125(a) (2).
93. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 13-A, § 1115(1) (A)-(C) (1974); S.C. CODE § 33-21-150(a) (1)
(1976). The South Carolina and Maine provisions on incomplete deadlock
track the Model Act. In addition, both states have added a third deadlock
section which reads: 'The shareholders are so divided respecting the man-
agement of the business and affairs of the corporation that (A) the corpora-
tion is suffering or will suffer irreparable injury, or (B) the business and
affairs of the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of the
shareholders generally." S.C. CODE § 33-21-150(1) (3) (1976).
94. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 99(b) (1)-(2) (West 1970):
A petition for dissolution of a corporation may be filed in the
supreme judicial court in the following cases:-
(b) Such a petition may be fied by the holder or holders of not
less than forty per cent of all the shares of its stock outstanding and
entitled to vote thereon, treating all classes of stock entitled to vote
as a single class for the purpose of determining whether the petition
is brought by the holders of not less than forty per cent of the out-
standing shares as aforesaid, if:
(1) the directors are deadlocked in the management of corporate
affairs, and the shareholders are unable to break the deadlock; or
(2) the shareholders are deadlocked in voting powers and have
failed to elect successors to directors whose terms have expired or
would have expired upon the election of their successors.
95. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1104(a) (1)-(3) (McKinney 1963):
(a) Except otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation
under section 613 (Limitations on right to vote), the holders of one-
half of all outstanding shares of a corporation entitled to vote in an
election of directors may present a petition for dissolution on one or
more of the following grounds:
(1) That the directors are so divided respecting the management
of the corporation's affairs that the votes required for action by the
board cannot be obtained.
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uisite is not carried over to the incomplete deadlock provision.96
Maryland requires that the petitioning shareholder own twenty-
five percent of the voting power in cases of complete deadlock.97
However, under the Maryland scheme, any shareholder entitled to
vote may petition for dissolution when there is an incomplete
deadlock.9 8
A number of other states permit involuntary dissolution in com-
plete and incomplete deadlock situations via approaches distin-
guishable from the language of the Model Act. California's statute
addresses, in separate provisions, the deadlock of uneven and even
boards of directors.99 In addition, the statute expressly recognizes
that internal dissension is a factor to be considered in deadlock.1 00
Delaware's statutory scheme is substantively the same as the
Model Act, providing for the appointment of a receiver or custo-
(2) That the shareholders are so divided that the votes required
for the election of directors cannot be obtained.
(3) That there is internal dissension and two or more factions of
shareholders are so divided that dissolution would be beneficial to
the shareholders.
The New York statute permits, however, a petition for dissolution to be
brought by the holdbrs of more than one-third of the outstanding stock, if the
certificate of incorporation provides that the proportion of votes needed for
election of directors is greater than the two-thirds requirement of section
1001. Id. § 1104(b).
96. Id. § 1104(c).
97. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-413(a) (1)-(2) (1975).
98. Id. § 3-413(b) (1).
99. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b) (2) (West 1977):
(b) The grounds for involuntary dissolution are that:
(2) The corporation has an even number of directors who are
equally divided and cannot agree as to the management of its affairs,
so that its business can no longer be conducted to advantage or so
that there is danger that its property and business will be impaired
or lost, and the holders of the voting shares of the corporation are so
divided into factions that they cannot elect a board consisting of an
uneven number.
The 1976 amendment to this statute addressed the special needs of the close
corporation by providing that any shareholder of a close corporation may file
a complaint for dissolution. Id. § 1800(a) (2). See also id. § 308 (allowing for
the appointment of a provisional director in cases of complete deadlock upon
the petition of any director or a shareholder owning at least 33'% of the
shares or in cases of incomplete deadlock upon the petition of shareholders
owning at least 50% of the voting power).
100. Id. § 1800(b) (3). This section states that dissolution may be granted when
"[t]here is internal dissension and two or more factions of shareholders in
the corporation are so deadlocked that its business can no longer be con-
ducted with advantage to its shareholders ... ." This language is also con-
tained in Minnesota's provision for deadlock dissolution. MwN. STAT. ANN.
§ 301.49(4) (West 1969). Unlike California, however, Minnesota has only one
provision for deadlock.
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dian in either complete or incomplete deadlock. 10 1 Oklahoma 0 2
and Ohio 0 3 also provide for dissolution in these two instances, but
neither require a showing of benefit to the shareholders or irrepa-
rable damage to the corporation. In Ohio, the action must be
brought by at least one-half of the directors or shareholders pos-
sessing one-half of the voting power. Narrowing the eligibility of
petitioning shareholders, Kansas provides for dissolution of a cor-
poration having only two shareholders, each of whom own fifty
101. DEL CODE tit. 8, § 226(a) (1) (2) (1975):
(a) The Court of Chancery, upon application of any stockholder,
may appoint 1 or more persons to be custodians, and, if the corpora-
tion is insolvent, to be receivers, of and for any corporation when:
(1) At any meeting held for the election of directors the stock-
holders are so divided that they have failed to elect successors to di-
rectors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon
qualification of their successors; or
(2) The business of the corporation is suffering or is threatened
with irreparable injury because the directors are so divided respect-
ing the management of the affairs of the corporation that the re-
quired vote for action by the board of directors cannot be obtained
and the stockholders are unable to terminate the division ....
102. OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 18, § 1.195(4) (West 1953):
The district court of the county in which the registered office is lo-
cated may, upon petition being filed, ,ntertain proceedings for the
involuntary dissolution of a domestic corporation when one or more
of the following circumstances is made to appear.
(4) That the number of directors is even and they are equally
divided respecting the management of the corporate affairs, and,
when the voting power of all shareholders is equally divided into two
independent ownerships or interests, that one-half thereof favor the
course of part of the directors, and one-half favor the course of the
other directors, or the holders of such equal parts of the voting power
are unable to agree on the election of the board of directors consist-
ing of an uneven number ....
Under OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.196(a) (1)-(2) (West Supp. 1977) the peti-
tion for involuntary dissolution may be fied by directors or shareholders who
have been registered owners for at least six months and own at least 10% of
the outstanding shares.
103. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.91 (A) (4) (Page Supp. 1977):
(A) A corporation may be dissolved judicially and its affairs
wound up:
(4) By an order of the court of common pleas of the county in
this state in which the corporation has its principal office, in an action
brought by one-half of the directors when there is an even number of
directors or by the holders of shares entitling them to exercise one-
half of the voting power, when it is established that the corporation
has an even number of directors who are deadlocked in the manage-
ment of the corporate affairs and the shareholders are unable to
break the deadlock or when it is established that the corporation has
an uneven number of directors and that the shareholders are dead-
locked in voting power and unable to agree upon or vote for the elec-
tion of directors as successors to directors whose term would
normally expire upon the election of their successors.
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percent of the stock.104 The statute permits either shareholder to
petition the court to dissolve in accordance with an agreed upon
plan of distribution.
Several states have no express statute dealing with dissolution
upon deadlock. For example, New Hampshire's statute permits
the court to dissolve the corporation upon the petition of "stock-
holders holding 1 of its stock whenever actual or impending insol-
vency or other cause renders its liquidation reasonably necessary
for the protection of the rights of the stockholders."' 0 Similarly,
Nevada permits shareholders owning ten percent of the outstand-
ing stock to petition in cases of insolvency or impending insol-
vency for an injunction and appointment of a receiver.106 West
Virginia permits a petition for dissolution from shareholders own-
ing not less than one fifth of the interest in the corporation. The
court is authorized to "proceed according to principles and usages
of law and equity" to determine whether dissolution is appropri-
ate. 0 7 Finally, Texas and Idaho provide no direct shareholder ac-
tion for judicial dissolution on any grounds.108
104. KAN. STAT. § 17.6804 (1974). Additionally, under id. § 17.6812(b), the court is
empowered to wind up the affairs of any corporation whose charter has been
revoked and to decree any remedies that shall "be just and equitable respect-
ing its affairs and assets and the rights of its stockholders and creditors."
105. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294-97 (1977) (emphasis added).
106. NEv. REV. STAT. § 78.630(1) (1973). More specifically, creditors or stockhold-
ers may bring an action "[w] henever any corporation shall become insolvent
or shall suspend its ordinary business for want of funds to carry on the same,
or if its business has been or is being conducted at a great loss and greatly
prejudicial to the interest of creditors or stockholders." Under NEV. REV.
STAT. § 78.650(1) (a)-(j), the holder of one-tenth of the outstanding stock may
seek dissolution if
(a) The corporation has willfully violated its charter; or
(b) Its trustees or directors have been guilty of fraud or collu-
sion or gross mismanagement in the conduct or control of its affairs;
or
(c) Its trustees or directors have been guilty of misfeasance,
malfeasance or nonfeasance; or
(d) The corporation shall be unable to conduct the business or
conserve its assets by reason of the act, neglect or refusal to function
of any of the directors or trustees; or
(e) The assets of the corporation are in danger of waste, sacrifice
or loss through attachment, foreclosure, litigation or otherwise; or
(f) The corporation has abandoned its business; or
(g) The corporation has not proceeded diligently to wind up its
affairs, or to distribute its assets in a reasonable time; or
(h) The corporation has become insolvent; or
(i) The corporation, although not insolvent, is for any cause not
able to pay its debts or other obligations as they mature; or
(j) The corporation is not about to resume its business with
safety to the public.
107. W. VA. CODE § 31-1-134 (Supp. 1974).
108. IDAHO CODE § 8-602 (1948): TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-5 (Vernon
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IV. ANALYSIS OF DEADLOCK UNDER THE STATUTES
The issue that remains to be addressed is whether the sacred-
ness of corporate existence is assailable in any greater degree
when there is specific statutory authority to dissolve a corporation
on grounds of deadlock or dissension than under traditional equi-
table principles. 10 9 In other words, will deadlock or dissension be
sufficient or will the petitioner need to prove some extenuating cir-
cumstances in order to persuade the court to dissolve the corpora-
tion? Have the courts in construing the statutes moved from the
earlier rule applied in the majority of cases that deadlock and dis-
sension alone were not sufficient reasons to grant dissolution?" 0
There is an unmistakable need for "freeing the incorporated part-
nerships of the unnecessary corporate constructions"' l when
trust, congeniality and confidence cease to exist among the princi-
pals. When the parties cannot agree on corporate affairs, when one
shareholder is dissatisfied with management and wishes to re-
deem his or her investment, or when it is unpleasant to work to-
gether in close proximity, there appears to be little justification for
the continued forced existence of the "partnership-like" corpora-
tion. Of course, the application of this policy, which would argua-
bly enhance the desirability of the corporate structure for the
small business, cannot be viewed in a vacuum. If inequities to any
of the parties would result from dissolution," 2 they must be con-
sidered by the courts in reaching the ultimate decision and in ap-
plying the statute. Whether or not the petitioner is required to
show irreparable injury to the corporation, benefit to the share-
holders, or simply the jurisdictional facts of deadlock will for the
most part produce varied results from the same facts.
For those states which do not provide for direct action by the
shareholders on grounds of deadlock, the common law dissolution
remedy would be available to the aggrieved shareholder." 3 In
states which permit a direct shareholder remedy for corporate dis-
Supp. 1978) (articles of incorporation of a close corporation may have a provi-
sion of dissolution the terms of which are based upon the shareholders'
desires).
109. Israels, supra note 1.
110. See note 68 & accompanying text supra.
111. In re Surchin, 55 Misc. 2d 888, 286 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1967) (quoting Prunty, Busi-
ness Associations, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1425, 1434 (1959)).
112. See notes 32-35 & accompanying text supra.
113. See Hall v. Nieukirk, 12 Idaho 33, 85 P. 485 (1906); Gibbs v. Morgan, 9 Idaho
100, 72 P. 733 (1903); Hammond v. Hammond, 216 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1948); note
68 supra. West Virginia permits shareholder action which directs that a court
may proceed to dissolve a corporation under the principles of law and equity.
W. VA. CODE § 31-1-134 (Supp. 1974). See Stevens v. Empire Cas. Co., 180 F.
283 (N.D.W. Va. 1910); Williams v. Croft Hat & Notion Co., 82 W. Va. 549, 96
S.E. 929 (1918).
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solution in cases of deadlock or dissension, the reasoning applied
and the results reached have been varied. Interpreting the Dela-
ware deadlock statute," 4 the court in Paulman v. Kritzer Radiant
Coils, Inc. 115 held that "a bare showing of failure to elect directors
for two successive annual meetings because of stockholder dead-
lock is not sufficient to require the court to appoint a receiver,
under the language of the statute."" 6 The statute in question used
"the permissive word 'may' rather than the mandatory 'shall' "11v
in describing the court's power to appoint receivers. The fact that
deadlock could go on indefinitely was an insufficient justification to
appoint a receiver under the statute. In the court's opinion, the
family members in Paulman had "'agree[d] to disagree"' when
they arranged the stock ownership in a fifty-fifty fashion." 8 The
court would not act where there was not "the slightest challenge to
the efficiency of the management and no suggestion that it [was]
deliberately being operated so as to solely benefit the stockholder
who [was] in control. There [was] no deadlock on the board or in
the operation of the business."" 9 Although the Delaware share-
holder-deadlock statute120 contains no express requirement of ir-
reparable injury or shareholder benefit, it is clear that the
Delaware court required more than a "bare showing of share-
holder deadlock" before it would grant dissolution.
The court in Reynolds v. Special Projects, Inc.121 applied section
4651(d) of the California Corporation Code122 and held that disso-
114. DEL CODE tit. 8, § 226(a) (1)-(2) (1975). See note 100 & accompanying text
supra.
115. 37 Del. Ch. 348, 143 A.2d 272 (1958).
116. 37 Del. Ch. at 350, 143 A.2d at 273 (emphasis added).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 351, 143 A.2d at 274. The ownership in Paulman was split between the
plaintiffs, two sisters who owned 50%, and their brother, the defendant, who
owned the balance.
119. Id. The board contained three positions, one of which had remained empty
for four years. The remaining two members were controlled by the defend-
ant, a 50% shareholder who as president controlled the operation of the cor-
poration. The fact that defendant had failed to have new certificates with
financial information issued to the plaintiffs was not sufficient to decree dis-
solution. Neither was dissolution justified by the fact that defendant refused
plaintiffs representation on the board. The court took the view that plaintiffs
were simply unhappy because defendant was "making a living from the busi-
ness," whereas they were receiving no return on their investment. See Hall v.
John S. Isaacs & Sons Farms, Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 244, 163 A.2d 288 (1960) (dissolu-
tion asked under section 226, but by time of trial, the issue of deadlock had
become moot since one faction gained substantial control).
120. DEL CODE tit. 8, § 226(a) (1)-(2) (1975).
121. 260 Cal. App. 2d 496, 67 Cal. Rptr. 374 (1968).
122. CAL CORP. CODE § 4651(d) (West 1955) (repealed 1975 Cal. Stats., ch. 682, § 6;
effective Jan. 1, 1977). This section read the same as the current law except
that the provision---"or the shareholders have failed at two consecutive an-
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lution was appropriate upon a showing of internal dissension cou-
pled with a failure of corporate purposes. 123 The purpose of the
corporation was to market the name of Debbie Reynolds. The dis-
sension existing between the two principals 124 centered on (1) the
length of the defendant's license to market the name, and (2) the
improper diversion of corporate funds to the defendant. 125 The
court did not state whether these disagreements would have been
sufficient for dissolution under the "internal dissension" language
of section 4651(d). 126 The dissolution appears to have turned on
the fact that the trial court found Reynold's cancellation of defend-
ant's license valid. The cancellation terminated defendant's right
to market the name; thus, no business purpose remained to con-
tinue the corporation. In Fuimaono v. Samoan Congregational
Christian Church,127 the California Supreme Court held that the
same statute required plaintiff to plead and prove "internal dissen-
sion and [that] two or more factions of shareholders . . . are so
deadlocked that its business cannot longer be conducted with ad-
vantage to its shareholders."' 28
nual meetings at which all voting power was exercised, to elect successors to
directors whose terms have expired or would have expired upon election of
their successors"--was added as an alternative ground to the language of the
former section 4651(d) in CAL CORP. CODE § 1800(b) (3) (West 1977). See
notes 98-99 supra. Compare Reynolds with State ex rel. Conlan v. Oudin &
Bergman Fire Clay Mining & Mfg. Co., 48 Wash. 196, 93 P. 219 (1908).
123. 260 Cal. App. 2d at 501, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
124. In Reynolds the plaintiff was issued 73 shares of stock of Special Projects, Inc.
Two shares went to a William Reynolds with the balance of 75 shares to the
defendant, Saperstein.
125. 260 Cal. App. 2d at 501, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
126. CAL CORP. CODE § 4651(d) (West 1955) (repealed 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 682, § 6).
See notes 98-99, 123 supra.
127. 66 Cal. App. 3d 80, 135 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1977).
128. CAL. CORP. CODE § 4651(d) (1955) (West) (repealed 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 682,
§ 6). In Fuimaono, plaintiffs were 40% of the membership and alleged both
deadlock and dissension. The dissension had begun when the minister fa-
vored by plaintiffs was summarily dismissed. The court ordered dissolution
of this religious non-profit corporation because the business of the church
could not be carried on to the advantage of any member of the church. While
it was the specific holding in Fuimaono that both dissension and deadlock
must be proved, the court does not specifically state how the deadlock over
business affairs was manifested in this case. It was clear, however, that the
dissension was substantial as evidenced by arguments over the physical as-
sets of the church, interference with the church's incoming mall, the fact that
the factions would not worship together and a street confrontation between
the two factions. 66 Cal. App. 3d at 84, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 801.
See Stumpf v. C.E. Stumpf & Sons, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 230, 120 Cal. Rptr.
671 (1975). In Stumpf, there were no findings of mismanagement, unfairness
or deadlock. The issue before the court was whether section 4651(f) (now
section 1800(b) (5)) of the California Corporation Code, which stated that dis-
solution would be granted if "[t]he liquidation is reasonably necessary for
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Interpreting the Minnesota statute, 129 which contains the same
language as its California counterpart,130 the court in In re Lake-
land Development Corp.13 1 held that dissolution could not be per-
mitted without a determination that there was an irreconcilable
deadlock. Even if such a determination had been made, irreconcil-
able deadlock alone was not sufficient without a further finding
that the "business accordingly cannot longer be conducted with
advantage to its shareholders."' 32
the protection of the rights or interests of any substantial number of the
shareholders, or the complaining shareholders," was applicable in the ab-
sence of mismanagement, unfairness or deadlock. The court held that if evi-
dence supported a finding under subsection (f), dissolution would be
appropriate without a finding on the other factors, because that was what the
legislature intended and there was no fear of minority abuse. Id. at 235, 120
Cal. Rptr. at 674.
129. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.49(4) (West 1969).
130. CAT. CORP. CODE § 4651(d) (1955) (repealed 1975 Cal. Stats. ch. 682, § 6).
131. 277 Minn. 432, 152 N.W.2d 758 (1967).
132. Id. at 440, 152 N.W.2d at 764. "'Advantage' affirmatively connotes elements of
opportunity, benefit, or profit, and negatively suggests absence of sacrifice,
harm or loss." Id. at 445, 152 N.W.2d at 767. The holding in Lakeland appears
consistent on its facts with the equitable nature of the dissolution remedy.
277 Minn. at 436, 152 N.W.2d at 761-62. While at the time of trial there were
just two shareholders, each owning an equal interest in the business, there
were two younger brothers claiming an interest in the corporation. Upon the
death of the father of the four brothers, claims against his estate had ex-
ceeded the cash assets. Petitioner sold the decedent's 20 shares of Lakeland
Co. to the objecting shareholder with the agreement that the objecting share-
holder would sell the petitioner 10 shares. The two younger brothers claimed
that if it had not been for this sale, the stock would have been divided equally
among the four sons. If these interests proved valid in other litigation, the
deadlock would probably be broken because there was evidence that the two
younger brothers would vote with the objecting shareholder. On these facts,
the court appropriately raised the irreconcilibility issue, although it is clear
that such a prerequisite is not expressly stated in the statute. Further, there
was proof that the business could be continued to the advantage of the share-
holder. This is assuming that benefit is measured solely in financial terms
with no regard to physical or mental benefits, as recognized by the New York
courts. See In re Surchin, 55 Misc. 2d 888, 286 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1967). In Lake-
land the principal asset of the corporation was eighteen acres of land. As
such, inaction resulting from the deadlock between the two shareholders who
disagreed over whether to retain the land or sell it immediately would proba-
bly result in appreciation in the land value rather than diminution.
See also In re Hedberg-Freidman & Co., 233 Minn. 534, 47 N.W.2d 424
(1951). In Hedberg-Freidman, the court held that when "differences between
two equally divided factions in a corporation are irreconcilable and the dis-
sensions between them incurable so as to make the continuance of the corpo-
ration unprofitable to its shareholders," the court may dissolve on that
ground alone. Id. at 539,47 N.W.2d at 428. The dissension between the share-
holders had started in 1935, and had intensified to the point that they no
longer talked to one another at work. Id. at 537, 47 N.W.2d at 426.
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In re Sheridan Construction Corp.133 concerned a "complete
frustration and standstill in board action"' 34 and "no hope of rec-
onciliation between [the] two brothers in the foreseeable fu-
ture."' 35 The New York court dissolved the corporation under
section 1104 of the New York Business Corporation Law.136 The
test applied by the court was "'whether judicially-imposed death
"will be beneficial to the stockholders or members and not injuri-
ous to the public." ' "137 The court in Sheridan found that because
dissolution would put an end to the losses which had continued
since 1958, it would be beneficial to the parties. 38
The court in In re Surchin139 relied heavily on the analogy be-
tween close corporations and partnerships. It held dissolution ap-
propriate under the New York statute 4 0 for a close corporation
consisting of two shareholders, each of whom owned one-half in-
terest. While the facts supported dissolution on all three grounds,
the court stated dissolution could be granted if the facts supported
just one ground.141 There was deadlock in the directorate and be-
tween the shareholders. Of interest is the fact that the court found
not only that dissolution would benefit the shareholders
financially, but that the stress on the physical and mental well-be-
ing of the petitioning shareholder would be relieved.1'
133. 22 A.D.2d 390, 256 N.Y.S.2d 210, affid, 16 N.Y.2d 680, 209 N.E.2d 290 (1965).
134. Id. at 391, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
135. Id. at 392, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 212.
136. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1104 (McKinney 1963). See notes 94-95 & accompany-
ing text supra.
137. 22 A.D.2d at 392, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 212 (quoting from In re Radom & Neidorff,
Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 7, 119 N.E.2d 563, 565 (1954)). See also In re Surchin, 55 Misc.
2d 888, 892, 286 N.Y.S.2d 580, 584 (1967) ("the benefit to the shareholders of a
dissolution is of paramount importance").
138. 22 A.D.2d at 392, 256 N.Y.S.2d at 212. Cf. Phinzy v. Anniston City Land Co., 195
Ala. 656, 71 So. 469 (1916) (equitable rule). See note 49 & accompanying text
supra.
139. 55 Misc. 2d 888, 286 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1967).
140. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1104(a) (1)-(3) (McKinney 1963).
141. 55 Misc. 2d at 891, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
142. The court stated:
I find as a fact that there is serious internal dissension between the
two shareholders, that there are two factions of shareholders, and
that dissolution would be beneficial to them, individually and to-
gether. And here I consider the statutory word "beneficial" to be ap-
plicable both in respect of the mental and physical well-being of a
shareholder as well as financial gain to him. I will say that I cannot
believe that I would not be authorized by this statute to direct a dis-
solution of a close corporation, when one of the two active sharehold-
ers, who is an active director and active officer of the corporation,
issues threats of personal violence, listens in surreptitiously on his
associate's telephonic talks, seizes and cuts telephone wires, acts in
the presence of employees so as to demean his associate as an em-
ployer in the corporation, takes trips at corporate expense without
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Affirming the liberalization 143 of the New York view on dissolu-
tion law, the court in Weiss v. Gordon 44 held that "when a point is
reached where the shareholders who are actively conducting the
business of the corporation cannot agree, it becomes in the best
interests of those shareholders to order a dissolution."' 45 This rule
does not require an inquiry into why the deadlock exists, but
merely a finding that it does exist.146
North Carolina permits statutory dissolution in cases of com-
plete deadlock if "the business can no longer be conducted to the
advantage of all the shareholders."' 4 7 This statute was applied in
Ellis v. Civic Improvement, Inc.,148 in which the two shareholders,
a doctor and a dentist, had formed a corporation in 1966 for the
advance mutual consent, leaves the shop inadequately manned, and
engages in other activities as if he were the sole owner of the busi-
ness. And I would say that dissolution would be in order even if
money were being made quite fully and readily by the corporation
under such conditions-which is not the case here.
Id. at 892, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
143. See In re Pivot Punch & Die Corp., 15 Misc. 2d 713, 182 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1959).
144. 32 A.D.2d 279, 301 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1969).
145. Id. at 281, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 842. See In re Goldstone, 40 A.D.2d 971, 338 N.Y.S.2d
756 (1972).
146. This analysis was also used by the court in In re Miller, [1977] 2 CoRP. LAw
(CCH) 11,256 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Feb. 23, 1977). There was no examination of
the petitioner's motives; the existence of deadlock was sufficient for dissolu-
tion. This rule is not, however, without exception. In Wollman v. LAttman, 35
A.D.2d 935, 316 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1970), the court held that when there exists an
equal division in the board of directors, each side representing a separate
function in the corporation, dissolution is inappropriate when it would place
one faction at a distinct disadvantage. Dissolution would not only squeeze
out the faction resisting it, "but would require the receiver to dispose of the
inventory with the (other faction) the only interested purchaser financially
strong enough to take advantage of the situation." Id. at 935, 316 N.Y.S.2d at
527.
See also Siegel v. 141 Bowery Corp., 80 Misc. 2d 255, 362 N.Y.S.2d 897
(1974), 51 A.D.2d 209, 38 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1976) (dissolution stayed). In Siegel,
the two shareholders had entered into an arbitration agreement which cov-
ered the issues that resulted in the dissension, and the court required that
the arbitration go forward.
See also In re Wainstock, N.Y.L.J. 15 (March 15, 1977). In Wainstock disso-
lution was held inappropriate under section 1104(3) of the New York Busi-
ness Corporation Law because
[p] etitioner has not shown that deadlock even exists, must less that
any disagreement has affected the functioning of either corporation.
The petitioner is apparently in complete control and it appears there
has been no opportunity as yet for deadlock to arise and affect the
conduct of the corporation's business.
The petitioner had sought on the death of the other 50% shareholder to
purchase the shares. This was refused by the distributees of the estate. Id.
147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a) (1) (1975). See note 91 & accompanying text
supra.
148. 24 N.C. App. 42, 209 S.E.2d 873 (1974).
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purpose of maintaining the only assets of the corporation, a lot and
building. The building was rented by the shareholders for profes-
sional office space.149 In 1968, plaintiff moved to another city and
terminated any payment of rent. Subsequently, defendant took
over the vacated area, but continued to pay the same amount in
rent. The court stated that under the statute,150 irreconcilable
deadlock was not sufficient for dissolution; there must be a further
finding that the corporation cannot be conducted to the advantage
of all the shareholders. The court held that the continued opera-
tion of the corporation could not be to the advantage of all the
shareholders since defendant had continued to pay rent on the
original two-thirds apportionment while receiving the benefit of
the use of the total building.15 1
The approach taken by the Missouri court in Gonseth v. K. & K.
Oil Co.,15 2 in applying the state's dissolution statute, 15 3 illustrates
a more stringent approach. The Missouri statute requires a finding
of irreparable injury to the corporation. 154 The court found no ir-
reparable injury because "'the books show[ed] that the corpora-
tion ha[d] prospered'"' 55 during the time of the deadlock.
Rejecting the view taken by the New York courts, 156 the court in
Gonseth stated "[t] he actions to which Gonseth objects-being de-
prived of her weekly salary as secretary and reduction in the rent
she received-are matters which affected her personally, not mat-
ter which have injured the corporation."' 5 7 In Goldstein v. Stud-
149. Id. at 44, 209 S.E.2d at 874. The plaintiff paid $180 per month as rent for ap-
proximately 600 square feet of the total 1,800 square feet in the building. De-
fendant paid $360 per month to rent approximately 1,200 square feet.
150. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a) (1) (1975).
151. 42 N.C. App. at 47, 209 S.E.2d at 876. Because plaintiff had not participated in
the management of the corporation since his move, any attempt to change the
situation would be in vain. There was undisputed evidence "that a meeting
of the Board of Directors would be merely an exercise in futility" because the
board was made up of plaintiff and defendant and their wives. Id.
152. 439 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1969).
153. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.485(1.) (1) (a) (Vernon 1966).
154. See note 90 & accompanying text supra. The Missouri provision deals with
complete deadlock. Under the Model Act, complete deadlock does not re-
quire a showing of irreparable injury. See note 73 & accompanying text
supra.
155. 439 S.W.2d at 27. The court dismissed plaintiffs claim of deadlock because it
was premised on the view that she and defendant were the only shareholders
and directors. The evidence at trial proved this claim not to be true because
the attorney who had done the legal work had been issued two shares. Plain-
tiff and defendant did have, however, equal ownership of the corporation as-
sets.
156. See In Re Surchin, 55 Misc. 2d 888, 890, 286 N.W.S.2d 580, 584 (1967), note 142 &
accompanying text supra.
157. 439 S.W.2d at 27. Compare Ellis v. Civic Improvement, Inc., 24 N.C. App. 42,
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ley,' 58 another Missouri case, the four member board of directors
was equally divided. Since the directors were also the four share-
holders owning equal interests, there was no hope of breaking the
stalemate in management. 5 9 This deadlock and animosity, mani-
fested in the substantial drop in sales, 60 failure to act on accounts
receivable or to file an income tax return, caused irreparable injury
to the corporation. Consistent with the holding in Gonseth and the
Missouri statutory language,' 6 ' dissolution in Goldsmith was pre-
mised only on the harmful effects to the business enterprise and
not the harm to the individual shareholder.
Under the Illinois deadlock provision,162 it was held in Ward v.
Colcord,163 that a court may find deadlock and grant dissolution
where one of the defendants refuses to perform business duties
and the by-laws require unanimous consent of the board of direc-
tors.16 Ward was a dissolution action brought by a fifty percent
shareholder against two other shareholders, each of whom owned
a twenty-five percent interest. Because the dissolution determina-
tion was grounded on the complete deadlock provision, 65 no proof
of irreparable injury to the corporation was needed. It was suffi-
cient to prove the jurisdictional facts that deadlock existed among
both the board and the shareholders.
In Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co.,l 66 the Oregon Supreme
Court construed its shareholder deadlock statute, 67 which, like
that of Illinois, mirrors the Model Act. 68 Although the provision
contains no language requiring benefit to the shareholders, the
court in Jackson held that it was plaintiffs burden to show not
only facts demonstrating deadlock among the shareholders, but
209 S.E.2d 873 (1974), cert. denied, 286 N.C. 413, 211 S.E.2d 794 (1975). See
notes 143-46 & accompanying text supra.
158. 452 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1970).
159. 452 S.W.2d at 80. There had been one shareholder meeting in 10 years. Be-
cause of dissension and the equal split of ownership, "[t]he shareholders
then departed without having transacted any business." Id. at 77.
160. Id. at 80. For the first nine months of 1968 sales were shown to be about $4850
whereas for 1966 corporate sales were $126,650.
161. See notes 153-57 supra.
162. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86(a) (1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978).
163. 110 Ill. App. 2d 68, 249 N.E.2d 137 (1969). In Ward, the original majority share-
holder brought an action to rescind the contract by which the two defendant
shareholders bought into the company.
164. The defendant shareholder had refused to either sign checks or pay the cor-
porate bills. It had necessitated a court order to ensure these duties were
carried out. Id. at 71, 249 N.E.2d at 139.
165. Ira- ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86(a) (1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978). See note 73 &
accompanying text supra.
166. 219 Or. 560, 348 P.2d 9 (1959).
167. OY. REv. STAT. § 57.595 (1) (a) (C) (1977).
168. See notes 74, 156-58 & accompanying text supra.
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also equitable reasons illustrating some actual benefit to the share-
holders to be obtained from dissolution.169 Because of the dissen-
sion existing between the two fifty percent shareholders in
Jackson, no new directors were elected for the years 1953 through
1956.170 Under the language of the statute, plaintiff argued that as a
matter of right, dissolution should be granted. The court reviewed
the equitable nature of the common law history of involuntary cor-
porate dissolution and determined its task to be purely discretion-
ary, and not mandated on the bare showing of facts of shareholder
deadlock. Dissolution was held to be an inappropriate remedy in
Jackson because the board was not paralyzed, but legally func-
tioning, the company was very prosperous, the principals chose to
have a board of three, the company employed sixty-five people and
the public interest needed to be considered, and plaintiff pos-
sessed the power to set defendant's salary.171 On these facts the
court found that dissolution would not be beneficial to all the
shareholders:
We think an equitable adjustment will be reached by denying rather than
granting dissolution in this case. To decree liquidation would give Hazel
Jackson a club to hold over the head of Herbert Jackson. To deny liquida-
tion imposes upon each party a certain amount of burden and uncertainty
so long as their differences continue. There is a possibility that Hazel and
Herbert Jackson may compose their differences amicably-it does not ap-
pear so far that either has attempted to oppress or unfairly deal with the
other. If they can not settle their disagreement, then we think that denial
of relief at the present time may well lead to a fairer buy-sell agreement
than the remedy of enforced liquidation, a remedy which might destroy
the going concern value of the plant and give both parties an unduly small
return for the value of their investment. 17 2
In Strong v. Fromm Laboratories173 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court interpreted section 180.771(1) (a) (4),174 a shareholder dead-
lock provision identical to that of Oregon, 7 5 and came to a result
opposite to that of the court in Jackson. Stating that it was not
plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that dissolution would be benefi-
cial to the shareholders, the court held:
Because of the extensive research made by the committee of eminent
Wisconsin corporation lawyers ... we must assume that its members
were familiar with the New York and Minnesota deadlock statutes and
169. 219 Or. at 586, 348 P.2d at 21.
170. The interests were as follows: Herbert Jackson, 24 % shares; Eva Jackson, 1
share; Hazel Jackson, 25 % shares. Herbert and Eva were married and cast
their votes together. Hazel was the plaintiff in Jackson.
171. 219 Or. at 586-87, 348 P.2d at 21-22.
172. Id. at 587, 348 P.2d at 22.
173. 273 Wis. 159, 77 N.W.2d 389 (1956).
174. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.771(1) (a) (4) (West 1957).
175. OR. REV. STAT. § 57.595(1) (A)-(C) (1977). See notes 166-72 & accompanying
text supra.
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court decisions interpreting the same, and that they preferred to word the
Wisconsin statute so as not to make dissolution or liquidation, because of
a stockholders' deadlock, contingent upon a finding that the same will be
beneficial to stockholders. We, therefore, hold that whether or not a liqui-
dation of Fromm Laboratories, Inc., will be beneficial or detrimental to the
stockholders is not a material factor to be considered in exercising the
power of liquidation conferred by section 180.771(1)(a)(4)-1 7 6
The court found that the trial court had no discretionary power not
to dissolve where a new director had not been elected because of a
voting deadlock following the death of a director. Section 180.30 of
the Wisconsin statutes required that "[t]he business and affairs of
a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors.' 77 Be-
cause of a peculiar by-law of Fromm Laboratories, Inc., which "ex-
pressly prohibit[ed] the board of directors of such corporation
from transacting any business after a vacancy occurr[ed] on the
board, except to call a meeting of the stockholders to elect a suc-
cessor director, until such vacancy has been filled,"'78 the Fromm
board had been acting without legal power for nearly a decade.
Stating that while the statutory provision may appear discretion-
ary on its face, the court held the provision mandatory when "there
is no alternative corrective remedy."'179 In Fromm the court saw no
alternative other than dissolution which would permit Fromm Lab-
oratories, Inc. to function and be legally managed as required
under section 180.30.180 Distinguishing Fromm, the court in Jack-
son v. Nicolai-Neppach Co.'81 stated:
[W] hether by act of the legislature or by virtue of the by-laws of the com-
pany-which, it is unnecessary to decide-the board of directors of Nico-
lai-Neppach Co. in office at the time of the deadlock continued to function
legally thereafter. Strong v. Fromm Laboratories held, on the other hand,
that under Wisconsin law the by-laws of a company may be drawn so as to
paralyze effectively the corporate function.
18 2
Finally, the Nebraska Supreme Court in Kollbaum v. K. & K.
176. 273 Wis. 171-72, 77 N.W.2d at 395.
177. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.30 (West Supp. 1978) (amended 1972).
178. 273 Wis. at 172, 77 N.W.2d at 395.
179. Id. at 173, 77 N.W.2d at 396 (emphasis added by Fromm court) (quoting In re
Collins-Doan Co., 3 N.J. 382, 396, 70 A.2d 159, 166 (1949)). Following is the full
text of the quote from Collins-Doan Co.:
And, if the statutory authority be deemed discretionary in essence,
there is no ground for withholding its affirmative exercise here, for
there is no alternative corrective remedy. Redress for the corporate
omissions may be had only by dissolution. The dissension is such as
to defeat the end for which the corporation was organized. The dead-
lock in the corporation's internal management is fatal to its exist-
ence.
3 N.J. at 396, 70 A.2d at 166.
180. 273 Wis. at 173, 77 N.W.2d at 396.
181. 219 Or. 560, 348 P.2d 9 (1959).
182. Id at 579, 348 P.2d at 18.
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Chevrolet, Inc.183 held dissolution appropriate for a corporation
where "'the directors are deadlocked in the management of the
corporate affairs and the shareholders are unable to break the
deadlock, and . . . irreparable injury to the corporation is being
suffered .... -184 Defining a deadlocked corporation as one which
"because of decision or indecision of the stockholders, cannot per-
form its corporate powers," the court found the corporation to fit
within the definition. 185 Substantial dissension and stalemate over
corporate decisions resulted in the corporation losing the Chevro-
let franchise. Subsequent to this, the petitioner terminated his
employment with the corporation and opened up his own repair
shop on a portion of the corporate property. The court concluded:
"It is undisputed that hard feelings exist between the shareholders
and this litigation demonstrates that the corporation can no longer
function in a viable fashion."' 86
V. CONCLUSION
The evolution of corporate existence from the time of the com-
mon law rule to the present day deadlock statutes illustrates that
over the years both courts and legislatures have progressed in
their willingness to address the special needs of the close corpora-
tion. It is the conclusion of this comment, however, that the prob-
lem of corporate dissolution in cases of deadlock cannot and will
not be fully handled without the adoption of the partnership anal-
ogy to the involuntary dissolution of the close corporation. While
the sacredness of corporate existence has been partially removed,
there still remains the influence of the common law rule which
generally precludes a resolution which is directed more to the
shareholders' interests than to the sanctity of the corporate body.
183. 196 Neb. 555, 244 N.W.2d 173 (1976).
184. Id. at 562, 244 N.W.2d at 177 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2096 (1) (a) (Reissue
1975)).
185. Id. In Kollbaum one of the plaintiffs, Kollbaum, and Kamrath had been em-
ployees at a Chevrolet dealership in Ponca, Nebraska. Following the death of
the owner, the two employees entered into a contract with the heirs to
purchase the property. Finding that they did not have enough money, the
two employees brought in Engel who agreed to provide $18,100 if the enter-
prise was incorporated and he was issued 55% of the interest. This was done.
In addition, Kamrath was given 25% and Kolbaum 20%. Kamrath died two
years later. The administrator of his estate joined Kollbaum as plaintiff. On
Kamrath's death, Engel wanted another party, Wentz, to become the new
dealer and purchase Kamrath's shares. Kollbaum, who wanted to be the new
dealer, refused Engers proposition. When Engel and Kollbaum could not
agree, the corporation lost the Chevrolet franchise. While the court clearly
found deadlock to exist, it is unclear how the deadlock occurred since Engel
possessed 55% and Kollbaum 20% of the stock.
186. Id. at 562, 244 N.W.2d at 177.
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A just and equitable solution to deadlock in the corporation cannot
exist if the reality that a close corporation is functionally "an incor-
porated partnership" is ignored by the judiciary. If the view of a
partnership analogy is adopted, then as Mr. Israels stated, it can be
shown that
[d]eadlock or stalemate in a close corporation is as completely socially
undesirable as in partnership or in a marriage, and that corporate contract
is not a holy sacrament. The remedy in the partnership case is beautifully
simple and over the years courts of equity appear to have administered it
satisfactorily... The interesting analogy lies in the fact that it is possi-
ble for any general partner, by his express will, to bring about a dissolu-
tion at any time regardless of the expiration of the term. The statute gives
a list of causes which will justify an order of dissolution.1 8 7
A review of the most recent cases decided under specific deadlock
statutes illustrates that those courts which permit dissolution on
the bare showing of the jurisdictional facts of deadlock 188 coupled
with a measurement of benefit to the shareholder in terms of phys-
ical, mental' 89 or simple financial advantage' 90 resemble most
closely the approach used in dissolving a partnership.
The prerequisite of showing irreparable injury to the corpora-
tion may in some instances coincide with dissolution permitted
under the benefit to the shareholder standard. However, to re-
quire a showing of irreparable injury necessarily directs the in-
quiry away from the circumstances of the petitioning shareholder.
The existence of the close corporation should not be so sacred as
to ignore the interests of the shareholder who has invested sub-
stantial assets in a corporate form of enterprise with the expecta-
tion that his or her relationship with the other investors and the
management of business affairs will be like that in a partnership.
Diane K. McDonald '79
187. Israels, supra note 1, at 789. See note 24 & accompanying text supra.
188. See Weiss v. Gordon, 32 A.D.2d 279, 301 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1969). See also notes
143-46 & accompanying text supra.
189. See In re Surchin, 55 Misc. 2d 888, 286 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1967). See also notes 139-
42 & accompanying text supra.
190. See Ellis v. Civic Improvement, Inc., 24 N.C. App. 42,209 S.E.2d 873 (1974). See
also notes 147-51 & accompanying text supra.
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